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Résumé: Nous proposons un algorithme de résolution du modèle monocentrique de transport avec 
congestion. Nous utilisons cet algorithme afin d'explorer l'impact de différents schémas de 
tarification de la congestion sur la forme urbaine, et par conséquent, sur les véhicules-
kilomètres (émissions de CO2) à long terme. L'application empirique concerne la région Île-
de-France. Quatre régimes de tarification sont considérés : (i) absence de tarification, où une 
taxe linéaire reflète le coût d'usage du véhicule ; (ii) péage cordon, où les voitures payent pour 
passer à l'intérieur d'une zone donnée ; (iii) taxe linéaire optimale, proportionnelle à la 
distance parcourue (optimale dans la classe des taxes linéaires) ; et (iv) taxe optimale 
(optimum de premier rang). Par rapport à (i), la taxe optimale aboutit à des réductions de 34% 
et 15%, respectivement pour le rayon de la ville et la distance parcourue moyenne.  
 
Abstract: We propose an efficient algorithm that solves the monocentric city model with traffic 
congestion, and use it to explore the impact of congestion pricing on urban forms and, hence 
on transport volume, emissions and energy consumption. The application focuses on the 
region Île-de-France. Four pricing policies are considered: no toll, where transport cost is 
equal to the vehicle operating cost, cordon toll where users pay the toll when they drive inside 
cordon region (location and value of the toll are both optimized) linear toll (optimal under the 
class of linear tolls) and optimal toll (or first-best toll). Our analysis shows that the linear toll 
is particularly effective in that it yields about 93\% of the welfare gain of the first-best toll. By 
comparison to the no-toll situation, optimal congestion pricing reduces the size of the city and 
the average travel distance by 34\% and 15\%, respectively. 
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1 Introdution
While the literature on road priing has been abundant in the last deades,
long term impat on housing and business loation have not reeived so
muh attention. Reent implementation of an area-based harge in London
and a few other experiments have raised onern about the overall impat
on ongestion, business ativities and environmental onditions in the long
run (f. Santos & Fraser 2006). At the same time, the alarming levels of
pollution reahed in many metropolitan areas and the important inrease of
energy ost ontribute to making the optimization of urban forms and the
regulation of transport an important issue (f. Mithell et al. 2005).
This paper explores the impat of transport priing on the urban form,
and, hene, on transport volume, CO2 emissions and energy onsumption.
We onsider a monoentri model with tra ongestion where all the eo-
nomi ativity is loated in the entral business distrit (CBD). There are two
main ators: households, whose utility is inreasing with housing area, and a
government that deides how muh land is devoted to roads. The government
ollets a population tax, whih is the same for all households, and a loa-
tion tax that depends on where the household lives.
1
Transport ongestion
introdues an externality that requires publi intervention for regulation.
Transport ongestion was introdued in the monoentri model by Strotz
(1965) and Mills (1967). In the following deade, there was growing interest
in seond-best alloations of land between housing and roads.
2
A synthesis
of this problem may be found in Kanemoto (1980). Reently, Mun et al.
(2003) have shown that seond-best priing shemes are almost as eient
as rst-best priing. Their onlusion has been onrmed by Verhoef (2005).
Both models, however, are rather restritive forms of the monoentri model.
Mun et al. (2003) do not onsider a variable housing area, and Verhoef (2005)
assumes that the amount of land alloated to transportation is xed. The
monoentri model has been used mainly for theoretial and normative dis-
ussions, and very little for empirial appliations.
3
1
On pratial grounds, road priing may ontribute to raising funds for the transport
setor (f. De Palma et al. 2007, de Palma & Quinet 2005).
2
Representative papers are Mills & Ferranti (1971), Solow (1972, 1973), Riley (1974),
Robson (1976), Kanemoto (1977), Arnott & MaKinnon (1978), Arnott (1979), and Sul-
livan (1983).
3
Empirial appliations inlude Baum-Snow (2007), Boarnet (1994), MMillen et al.
(1992) and Rouwendal & van der Straaten (2008).
2
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Figure 1: Impats of ongestion priing.
We adopt the monoentri ity framework using the formulation of Fu-
jita (1989), and ontribute to the literature at two stages. First, we propose
a exible and eient algorithm to ompute the optimal solution. The so-
lution approah underlying the algorithm replaes the standard optimality
onditions (f. Fujita 1989) by a set of rst-order dierential equations that
an be solved eiently by standard numerial tehniques.
4
The algorithm
is exible enough to be used for a number of priing rules.
Seond, we undertake an empirial appliation on the agglomeration of
Île-de-Frane (IDF). In partiular, we feed the model with data from IDF and
nd that it sueeds in adequately apturing a number of urban features. On
the basis of the alibrated model, we quantify the impats of dierent priing
rules: ordon, linear and rst-best tolls. All poliies lead to a smaller ity
and a redued average trip-distane.
Figure 1 illustrates the impats of ongestion priing on the distribution
of households. Eah urve reets the distribution of households under a
given regime. Road priing motivates households to move loser to the CBD.
Linear toll depends on only the travel distane, while rst-best toll, whih is
non-linear, depends on the ongestion or external ost reated by the trip.
A unit of trip-distane in a ongested area is tolled more than the same unit
4
The model was solved under a partiular set of parameter values in Riley (1974),
Robson (1976) and Kanemoto (1977), but no general solution method has been proposed.
3
in an unongested area. In this monoentri geometry, ongestion is higher
around the CBD and it is there that the dierene with linear tolls emerges.
In Figure 1, the impats of the (optimal) linear toll and rst-best toll are
rather similar in the outer part of the ity, but they beome quite distint
around the CBD.
Optimal priing redues the radius of the ity, the average trip-distane
and ongestion by 34%, 15% and 13%, respetively. The optimal linear toll,
5
whih we all linear toll for short, indues a omparable impat and leads
to a relatively dense ity. But in pratie, the linear toll is equivalent to an
important inrease in gasoline prie. Suh a poliy is likely to fae road user
opposition and has the inonveniene of depending on only the length of the
trip and not on its loation (origin/destination pair). For example, urban
and inter-urban trips (whih indue less ongestion) are tolled the same way.
So, under a more general transport network the linear toll will be less eient
than in the model we onsider here. Eieny is measured as the unspent
part of the households' revenue, for a given level of utility.
Cordon priing is less eient than linear toll but still reahes an a-
eptable eieny level of 62% with respet to rst-best. By ontrast to
linear tolls, ordon tolls onern only highly ongested areas and turn out
to be an attrative alternative for poliy makers. Indeed, similar priing
rules to ordon toll are already in use in some ities (London and Singapore,
in partiular), and other implementation projets are under study. From
the simulation we have onduted, it appears that an optimal urban form re-
quires both a smaller radius and a higher onentration of households around
the CBD (f. Figure 1). The rst-best rules satisfy these requirements by
setting the toll equal to the external ost. Linear toll is more eient in
reduing the radius of the ity than in onentrating households around the
CBD. In general, under the linear rule, the optimal trade-o between the two
objetives requires an exessive harge on road users.
A ordon toll lose to the CBD does not have a strong impat on the
radius of the ity. At the same time, a ordon toll away from the CBD
has substantial impat on the radius of the ity but does not indue any
signiant variation in the onentration of households inside the ity. In
most ases, and for data related to Île-de-Frane, we found that it is optimal
to set the ordon toll at a distane about 21km from the ity enter.
Priing redues the size of the ity but the average area oupied by house-
5
That is, optimal among linear tolls.
4
holds does not derease so muh. On one hand, part of the land available for
housing and transportation is lost. However, this lost area is not very large
sine, as the empirial observation shows, the available land for housing and
transportation gets smaller as we move away from the ity enter. On the
other hand, with ongestion priing, the surfae of land alloated to roads
dereases and larger areas are available for housing. Overall, both impats
have omparable magnitudes and the resulting variation in the housing area
remains, in general, small.
On more general grounds, priing ongestion ontributes to dereasing the
level of pollution sine it leads to smaller and more ompat ities. Indeed,
energy onsumption per household dereases as urban density inreases (f.
Newman & Kenworthy 1989). Sine CO2 emissions are orrelated with trip-
distane, ongestion priing has an appreiable environmental benet. The
set of simulations we have onduted shows that ongestion priing redues
the level of emissions by 15%, and has a omparable impat on ongestion.
The paper is organized as follows. In Setion 2 we introdue the notation and
provide the solution proedure for the land-use equilibrium. The alibration
of the model to IDF is undertaken in Setion 3. In Setion 4 we disuss the
impat of ongestion priing. We nally onlude in Setion 5.
2 A general method to ompute a ompensated
equilibrium
2.1 The basi framework
The analysis is arried out under the lassial monoentri model. We adopt
the formulation of Fujita (1989) and denote the model by HST .
6
The number
of households living in the ity is xed and equal to N (losed ity). The
variable r denotes the distane from the enter of the ity. Eah household
makes daily trips from its loation, at distane r from the enter of the ity,
to the Central Business Distrit (CBD) that extends to distane rc from
the enter of the ity. Inside the CBD, we assume that transportation is
ostless. The radius of the ity is denoted by rf . N(r) is the number of
households loated further than distane r from the ity enter. L(r) is the
amount of land available for housing or transportation at r. LT (r) is the
6
Fujita (1989) refers to the model as the Herbert-Stevens model with tra ongestion.
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amount of land alloated for transportation at r. Eah household onsumes
two goods, housing s and a omposite good z, and gets a utility U(z, s) where
∂U(z, s)/∂z > 0 and ∂U(z, s)/∂s > 0. All households have the same utility
funtion and the same (pretax) revenue Y . The prie of the omposite good
is normalized to 1 and the unitary prie of land, or land rent, at distane r
from the ity enter is R(r). The opportunity ost of land, or the agriultural
rent, is denoted by RA. The amount of omposite good neessary to ahieve
utility level u when the housing area is equal to s is Z(s, u), whih is the
solution of U(z, s) = u in z. Let I denote the revenue net of taxes. The
household bid rent funtion ψ(I, u) is given by
ψ(I, u) := max
s≥0
I − Z(s, u)
s
, (1)
where the maximum is reahed at the bid-max lot size S(I, u)
S(I, u) := argmax
s≥0
I − Z(s, u)
s
. (2)
The government is responsible for providing the transportation infrastru-
ture, LT (r), and has the possibility of levying two kinds of taxes: a popula-
tion tax that does not depend on r and is denoted by g, and a loation (or
ongestion) tax that depends on r and is denoted by l(r).
The road oupany at r is dened by the ratio of the number N(r) of
households loated further away than r from the ity enter to the amount
LT (r) of land devoted to transport use at r. At eah distane r, the transport
ost depends on the road oupany at r: c(N(r)/LT (r)), where the funtion
c is assumed to satisfy c(w) > 0, c′(w) > 0 and c′′(w) > 0 for all w ≥ 0. The
transport ost from distane r to the CBD is
τ(r) =
∫ r
rc
c
(
N(x)
LT (x)
)
dx. (3)
Dene the bid rent of the transport setor ψT at eah distane r as the
marginal benet of land for transportation at r:
ψT
(
N(r)
LT (r)
)
= c′
(
N(r)
LT (r)
)(
N(r)
LT (r)
)2
. (4)
The bid rent ψT (N(r)/LT (r)) represents the umulated gain for the N(r)
ommuters (away from r) from a unit inrease of roads at r.
6
2.2 Solution approah
The household's problem is to maximize the utility funtion U(z, s) over r,
z and s subjet to the revenue onstraint z+R(r)s = Y − g− l(r)− τ(r). If
we replae I in (1) by7 Y − g− l(r)− τ(r), we obtain the household bid rent
at distane r
ψ(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u) = max
s
Y − g − l(r)− τ(r)− Z(s, u)
s
, (5)
and the orresponding bid-max lot size S(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u). Appendix
A provides an interpretation of the HST model and the role played by the
population tax g. Sine all households are idential, it is onvenient to as-
sume that they all reah the same utility level at an optimal solution.
8
The
objetive of the entral planner is to maximize the total surplus in the ity.
Let n(r) denote the number of households in an annulus of unit width at r.
The objetive funtion to be maximized over (nonnegative) quantities n(r),
s(r), LT (r) and rf is the following total surplus S :
S =
∫ rf
rc
{[Y − τ(r)− Z(s(r), u)− RAs(r)]n(r)−RALT (r)}dr. (6)
Any distribution n(r) of households should satisfy the following onstraints.
First, the total amount of land devoted to housing and transportation must
be lower than or equal to the amount of land available:
n(r)s(r) + LT (r) ≤ L(r) for rc ≤ r ≤ rf . (7)
Seond, the distribution of households satises:
N(r) =
∫ rf
r
n(r)dr for rc ≤ r ≤ rf . (8)
Finally, all households are loated inside the ity:
N = N(rc) =
∫ rf
rc
n(r)dr. (9)
7
Indeed, Y − g− l(r)− τ(r) is the part of the inome that remains for the onsumption
of housing (s) and the homogeneous good (z).
8
Without this assumption, an optimal solution may imply an inreasing utility as
we move away from the CBD (f. Riley 1974, Papageorgiou & Pines 1999). When all
households are assumed idential suh a situation may seem inonsistent and the Mirrlees
paradigm of the unequal treatment of equals appears (f. Mirrlees 1972). We avoid this
disussion and onsider only solutions with equal utilities among households.
7
Sine the bid rent funtion ψ(I, u) is ontinuously inreasing in I, we an
dene φ(R, u) by
φ(R, u) := I ⇔ ψ(I, u) = R. (10)
The quantity φ(R, u) is the aftertax revenue required by a household having
utility level u and willing to pay a land rent R. The optimality onditions
of this problem (maximize (6) subjet to onstraints (7), (8) and (9)) are
realled in their standard form in Appendix A. They represent onditions
for the ompensated equilibrium in whih the ommon utility u is ahieved
by a ompetitive land market with ommon loation tax g and an optimal
loation tax l(r). The idea of the approah we propose is to transform stan-
dard optimality onditions (Equations (22a)-(22f) in Appendix A) into a set
of rst-order dierential equations. Bruekner (2005) proposed a similar ap-
proah but under a framework where the proportion of land devoted to roads
is xed. We have the following result.
Proposition 1. Let u > 0 be a xed utility level. The solution of the problem
whih onsists in maximizing (6) subjet to onstraints (7), (8) and (9) an be
omputed in the following way. Solve, for all positive rf and for rc ≤ r ≤ rf ,
the system of bakward dierential equations :

R′(r) = −
c′
(
Ψ−1T
(
R(r)
))
Ψ−1T (R(r)) + c(Ψ
−1
T (R(r)))
∂φ
∂R
(R(r), u)
N ′(r) =
N(r)
Ψ−1
T
(R(r))
− L(r)
S(φ(R(r), u), u)
,
(11)
with terminal onditions R(rf ) = RA and N(rf ) = 0. Then, nd rf suh
that N(rc) = N . From these, ompute LT (r) = N(r)/Ψ
−1
T (R(r)), s(r) =
S(φ(R(r), u)) and l(r) =
∫ r
rc
c′(Ψ−1T (R(r
′)))Ψ−1T (R(r
′))dr′ for rc ≤ r ≤ rf .
Proof. See Appendix B.
This proedure assumes that n(r) > 0 and LT (r) > 0 for all rc ≤ r ≤
rf . While the seond ondition is guaranteed at any optimal solution,
9
it
is possible that households density be equal to zero at some distane r. In
Appendix C we provide details on how to implement this algorithm and show
how to handle the ase where n(r) = 0 for r > rc.
9
If not, N(r)/LT (r) will be unbounded induing a very high transportation ost.
8
In order to ompare the optimal priing rule with alternative poliies, we
relax the analytial form in the rst equation of (11) by introduing the more
exible rule:
H(r) =


c′(Ψ−1T (R(r)))Ψ
−1
T (R(r)) (rst-best)
κ (linear toll)
ξd I{rd}(r) (ordon toll),
(12)
where κ and ξd are positive onstants and I{rd}(r) the funtion that takes
value one at rd and zero elsewhere along with replaing the rst equation in
(11) by R′(r) = −(H(r) + c(Ψ−1T (R(r))))/(∂φ(R(r), u)/∂R). Then, instead
of (11), we solve the system of dierential equations given by

R′(r) = −
H(r) + c(Ψ−1T (R(r)))
∂φ
∂R
(R(r), u)
N ′(r) =
N(r)
Ψ−1
T
(R(r))
− L(r)
S(φ(R(r), u), u)
.
(13)
The seond priing rule in (12) orresponds to a harge that is proportional
to the length of the trip, where κ is the harge per unit of distane. Suh may
reet a harge implemented as a gasoline tax. Notie that the linear toll
does not depend on the origin and destination of the trip. The third priing
rule in (12) reets ordon priing. Eah driver pays ξd for rossing the ring
of radius rd. Households living inside this ring do not pay the harge.
3 Calibration on Île-de-Frane
In this setion, we alibrate the model parameters to math seleted target
variables related to the IDF (Île-de-Frane) region. The monoentri model
may be ritiized as being based on unrealisti assumptions. Indeed, many
metropolitan regions have a polyentri struture, and many authors on-
sider that the main eort should therefore fous on polyentri models (f.
Mieszkowski & Mills 1993, forexample). The monoentri framework, how-
ever, remains very useful for at least three reasons. First, for the ase of
IDF, as we disuss below, there is a high onentration of (non-industrial)
ativities in the CBD loated inside Paris. Seond, the monoentri model
9
is useful when we onsider only part of the eonomi ativity and the related
transportation. In partiular, in IDF, most eonomi ativities with highly
skilled employees are onentrated in the CBD. This issue is partiularly rel-
evant sine polyentri models have not yet been used suessfully. Third,
given that the theory underlying the monoentri model is muh more oher-
ent and omplete (many theoretial insights have already been gained), the
empirial exerise an be evaluated muh more aurately than if polyentri
models are used. We do not intend to say that the monoentri model is
superior to polyentri models, but we argue that there are many lessons we
an draw from it if we remain aware of its limitations. Moreover, empiri-
al observations still onrm the high onentration of eonomi ativities
in small areas. For the ase of IDF, a reent report by Pottier et al. (2007)
states that more than three million households (among a total of ve million)
are working in the twenty distrits inside Paris. The ratio is even higher for
highly skilled employees, who generally use private ars relatively frequently.
Moreover, maps from AIRPARIF show a high onentration of emissions in
the CBD and the region around. On the basis of these observations, we think
that many urban attributes of IDF an be explored within the monoentri
framework.
3.1 A spei model
The related literature has extensively onsidered the Cobb-Douglas utility
funtion:
10
U(z, s) = zαsβ with α > 0 , β > 0 . (14)
From U(s, z) = u, we have the quantity of omposite good
Z(s, u) = u1/α s−β/α, (15a)
and the solution of (2) yields
S(I, u) = (
α+ β
α
)
α
β u
1
β I−
α
β . (15b)
Substituting it in (1) yields the bid rent funtion
ψ(I, u) =
β
α + β
(
α
α + β
)
α
β u−
1
β I
α+β
β . (15)
10
See Robson (1976), Verhoef (2005) and Kanemoto (1977).
10
The inverse of (15) gives
φ(R, u) =
α + β
α
(
Rα
β
) β
α+β
u
1
α+β . (15d)
For the ongestion funtion, we use the BPR (Bureau of Publi Roads) for-
mula (f. Branston 1976)
c(γ) =
θ
v0
(1 + k′γλ) , (16)
where k′ is a positive onstant, v0 is the maximum travel speed and θ the
households' valuation of time. This funtion satises the onvexity require-
ment for k′ > 1 and λ > 1. In (16) the travel ost is the sum of two
terms. The rst term does not depend on the road oupany and reets
the transport ost without ongestion. The seond term aptures the impat
of ongestion. Indeed, as road oupany inreases, travel speed dereases
and the travel time inreases. Dene k = k′ θ/v0. The impat of a marginal
inrease in roadoupany is c′(γ) = kλγλ−1. Using (4) and (15) we an
obtain all expressions required in the omputation of (13):

ψT (γ) = c
′(γ)γ2 = kλγλ+1
ψ−1T (R) = (
R
kλ
)
1
λ+1
c(ψ−1T (R)) =
θ
v0
+ k
1
λ+1 (
R
λ
)
λ
λ+1
c′(ψ−1T (R))ψ
−1
T (R) = (kλ)
1
λ+1R
λ
λ+1 ,
(17)
where γ = ψ−1T (R).
3.2 Base-ase parameter values
We t the above model with data from IDF.
Land available
We assume
L(r) = µ(r)× 2pir , (18)
11
Loal roads Main roads Highways
Length (km) 14490 2752 1814
Max. speed (km/h) 50 70 110
Table 1: Road network in Île-de-Frane.
where µ(r) is the fration of land devoted to housing and transportation at
r.11 Data from IDF show that the proportion of land used for housing and
transportation, with respet to the total available land, dereases as we move
away from the CBD. Furthermore, olletive houses are more onentrated
near the CBD and individual houses spread away from the ity enter. Col-
letive houses are generally built on more than four levels, while individual
houses are built on one or two levels. It is important to take into aount
this fat in order to math the observed distribution of households. We
approximate µ(r) by an exponential expression, whih yields
µ(r) = 3.191 e−8.7×10
−5r (R2 = 0.99). (19)
Figure 5 shows both observed values (dots) and their approximation (lines).
As we move away from the CBD the fration of land available for housing
and transportation dereases substantially.
Travel speed
There are two options at least on how to ompute free-ow travel speed: v0.
First, one may onsider that it is onstant over all the region. In this ase
it an be omputed as the (harmoni) mean of the maximum allowed speeds
over the network of three kinds of roads. The details of the network are
shown in Table 1 and give a value of about 55 km/h.
A better approah is to onsider that the free-ow travel speed dereases
as we get loser to the CBD. This ase arises beause a driver inside Paris uses
mainly (slow) loal roads but an drive on faster roads in outer regions. To
take into aount the fat that the free-ow speed inreases as we move away
from the CBD, we approximate it as follows. At the ity border a traveller
mainly uses highways where the speed limit is 110 km/h. A household will
11
Fujita & Thisse (2002) report that only 12% is used in this sense and all the remaining
area is used for agriulture, proteted areas, et.
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Variable Value Unit
rc 3 500 m
N 2 120 493 household
θ 6 900 eh−1year−1
RA 48 em
−2
year
−1
Table 2: Base-ase parameter values
be likely to use highways less as we get loser to the CBD. We assume
12
that
to travel from the ity enter to the CBD, on average, 80% of the trip is made
on highways, and 20% on main roads. A trip that starts loser to the CBD
uses less highways but the same fration of main roads. Instead, urban area
roads (with a speed limit of 50 km/h) substitute for highways. Denoting by
wh and wn the respetive frations of usage of highways and main roads, the
average speed is the harmoni mean(
wh
110
+
wn
70
+
1− wh − wn
50
)
=
1
v0
,
or v0 = 3 850/(77− 42wh − 22wn). As mentioned above, wn is xed at 20%.
Assuming a linear form of wh and taking into aount that wh = 0.8 at rf
and wh = 0 at rc, we end up with the following relation between the free-ow
travel speed and the distane to the ity enter:
v0 =
51 931
1− 5.92× 10−6r
.
Hene, the free-ow travel speed dereases from about 90km/h at distane
70km (entrane of the ity) from the ity enter to 52km/h at distane 10km
(where the maximum speed generally beomes low). This derease is more
realisti and leads to better alibration than the xed v0.
Households
We onsider a population of drivers going to and from the ity enter 230 days
a year,
13
and estimate osts over one year. Some parameter values are pro-
vided in Table 2. The number of households used is adjusted so that it
12
Based on the authors judgement from a Google-Earth exploration.
13
This is approximately: 5 days x 52 weeks - 30 days (holidays).
13
orresponds to the number of vehiles used for home-to-work trips. Sine
we onsider a CBD of radius 3.5 km, and sine we onsider only households
that make trips to the CBD, we remove half of the population loated in the
ring that extends from 0 to 7 kilometers. Aordingly, we onsider a total
population of N = 2 120 493 households.
Utility funtion
From the Cobb-Douglas utility funtions properties, we know that the ratio
β/α is equal to the share of the available revenue spent on housing with
respet to the share spent on the homogeneous good. Robson (1976) assumed
a value of 50% and Kanemoto (1977) redued the approximation to what
seems to be a more realisti 20%. In the base-ase, we onsider the seond
value whih mathes reent estimations reported in INSEE (2003). Thus, we
have α = 4β, so that
U(z, s) =
(
z4s
)β
. (20)
An alternative value of β is onsidered for the sake of omparison.
Congestion term
The ongestion funtion depends on the maximum speed inside the ity, the
value of time and parameters k′ and λ in (16). Boiteux (2001) reports that
the value of time in IDF in 2001 was 11.6e/h for home-to-work trips.14 To
take into aount the inrease sine 2001, we take the value of 15e (whih
orresponds to a ve year growth rate at 5%). So, during a year with 230
working days and an average of two trips per day, we have θ = 15 × 230 ×
2 (eh−1year−1). Both parameters are used in the alibration of the model.
As a omparative statis exerise we onsider an alternative situation with a
higher level of ongestion and ompare with the base-ase.
Tolling shemes
We onsider four poliies:
- no toll (NT), where κ in (12) reets vehile operating ost;
14
For the sake of omparison, the average value of time for work trips reported in Small
& Verhoef (2007), Chapter 3, is $9.14/h for metropolitan areas in the US in 2003.
14
- ordon toll (CT), where a driver pays a toll when he enters inside the
ring of a given radius;
- (optimal) linear toll (LT), where κ is set to the value that maximizes
the surplus in (6);
- a rst-best toll (FB) that internalizes the external osts.
The no toll rule may be interpreted as a small tax or, better, the vehile
operating ost per kilometer. On the basis of a gasoline prie of 1.5e per liter,
the gasoline ost per meter for an average vehile that onsumes 6 liters per
100 kilometer is 0.0207 e per meter per year. Assuming that gasoline prie
is half the vehile operating ost we use κ = 0.0414 for the NT poliy.15 For
the ordon toll, both the loation and the value are hosen to maximize the
surplus S (u) given in (6). For the linear toll (LT), we searh for the value
of κ that maximizes S (u). In pratie, the optimization proess is a tedious
but straightforward task. Priing rule NT is the referene poliy, sine it is
lose to the real situation.
Calibration
A dataset related to rings with 7km intervals is used to feed the model with
data. To repliate the urban struture of IDF, we onstrut a loss funtion
(denoted Loss) that depends on the four parameters u, β, k and λ. The
loss funtion is equal to the weighted sum of square errors between observed
data and the output of the model. We fous on the radius of the ity (rf ),
the distribution of the households (pop), the travel time (tt) and the level of
urban rent (rent). The expression of the loss funtion is
Loss(u, β, k, λ) =∑
r∈7,14,...,70
{wrf
(
Mrf − rf
rf
)2
+ w
rent
(
M r
rent
−R(r)
R(r)
)2
+
w
tt
(
M r
tt
− tt(r)
tt(r)
)2
+ w
pop
(
M r
pop
− pop(r)
pop(r)
)2
}, (21)
where wx denotes the weight of variable x and M
r
x denotes the value of x
predited by the model at r (r measured in km). The four variables are not
15
Based on authors' judgement and data values from INSEE (2005).
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Figure 2: Distribution of households:
observed and predited (R2 = 0.987).
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Figure 3: Travel time: observed and
predited (R2 = 0.97).
measured in the same way: rent is the average rent between r and r−∆r (we
have used ∆r = 7km), tt is the average travel time for households between
r and r − ∆r, pop is the number of households between r and r − ∆r.
The weights are set equal (and normalized to one) by default. They may be
hanged to fous the alibration on a given set of variables. The funtion
Loss(u, β, k, λ) reahes a unique minimum when the output of the model
perfetly mathes the observed values. Table 4 ontains the values of target
variables along ten rings as indiated in the rst olumn. The seond olumn
ontains the number of households. Values in the third olumn orrespond
to the number of vehiles used for home-to-work trips. As we are mainly
interested in transport, this variable may be used instead of the number of
households. The fourth olumn ontains the travel time for the same type
of trips. Rent values (based on observations from indie notaire-INSEE in
2007) are reported in the last olumn.
The model is alibrated with respet to poliy LT, i.e. when households
pay a tax that reets the vehile operating ost. The output of the model
with parameter values u = 11 976, β = 0.2, λ = 4.02 and k′ = 6.6 × 10−12
ts partiularly well the distribution of households and travel time. Figure 2
shows the observed distribution of households in IDF and the distribution
produed by the model. The orrelation is satisfatory. Figure 3 shows
observed and predited values for the travel time. The orrelation between
the two sets is high, even if the slope of the predited values seems higher. The
variable free-ow travel speed has been useful for rening the approximation
of travel time. The only variable that does not seem to be well tted by the
16
model is the land rent. This fat may be explained intuitively as follows.
Under the monoentri ity framework, the market rent is an exlusive result
of transport osts. The attrativeness of the CBD lies in the fat that we
inur lower travel time. But in reality, the attrativeness of the CBD of Paris
is the result of many other attributes: a riher soial life, better aess to
many failities and so on. This dierene is one of the limitations of the
model used here.
4 Results
Simulation outputs are presented in Table 5. Table 3 ontains a smaller set
of the output of the base-ase senario. Under eah senario there are four
priing rules: no toll, ordon toll, linear toll and rst-best toll. The base-ase
uses parameter values disussed above and summarized in Table 2. The rst
olumn of Table 5 provides loation tax orresponding to H(r) given in (12).
The seond olumn ontains the radius of the ity rf . Column s orresponds
to the average area oupied by a household (s =
∫ rf
rc
s(r) n(r)dr/N). The
average (one-way) trip-distane VK =
∫ rf
rc
r n(r)dr/N is given in olumn VK .
Column RD ontains the surfae of land alloated to roads. TT and TT0
denote the average travel time and the free-ow travel time, respetively.
The soial ost per household is deomposed into three items (all expressed
for an average household per year): CL, the opportunity ost of land; CT ,
the generalized transport ost; and CZ , the ost of the homogeneous good.
Column ∆S orresponds to the impats of priing on the surplus of an
average household per year. We now disuss the impat of eah priing rule
under the base-ase and then ompare with two alternative senarios.
4.1 The struture of the ity
No toll
Without tolling, drivers inur only the vehile operating ost. The urban
region extends to a radius of 73km whih orresponds to the atual radius of
IDF. The average area oupied by a household is 84 m
2. The average length
of a trip is 22km and the average duration 38 mins. The amount of taxes
olleted (769e) is lose to annual spending on private transport in IDF. The
density of households inreases as we move from rf to the CBD. It delines
17
rf s VK RD TT ∆S
City Housing Trip Roads' Travel ∆surp
radius area length area time
km m2 km 104m2 mins e/y
No toll 73.423 84.236 22.075 7 539 37.7 0
Cordon toll 55.633 84.889 19.632 6 482 33.9 181
Linear toll 46.246 81.385 18.727 6 042 32.7 271
First-best 48.650 83.129 18.711 6 049 32.7 286
Table 3: The struture of the ity (base-ase). Cordon toll: loated at 22km,
value 22.5e/day; Linear: κ = 0.21/m/year
substantially near the CBD, beause households living in the ity enter do
not use their ars frequently for home-to-work trips. Vehile emissions, in
partiular for CO2, are highly orrelated with the trip-distane, and a poliy
that redues the latter is environmentally eetive. Indeed, transportation
is the leading setor in terms of CO2 emissions in Frane (141 million-tons
in 2005, aording to ADEME). Assuming an average emission of 153 g/km
(reported for 2006 by ADEME), IDF aounts for a total of 3.3 million-tons
of CO2 per year for just home-to-work trips.
16
This situation is not optimal sine ongestion externality is not taken
into aount by road users.
17
Congestion priing has long been advoated as
the onvenient tool to remove market distortions and inrease welfare. We
explore the impats of three alternative poliies.
Cordon toll
Drivers pay the toll when they enter a given ring. The value of the toll as well
as its loation are both hosen to maximize the surplus in (6). The optimal
loation of the ordon is at 22km from the ity enter and eah household
going inside the toll region pays 22.5e per day. This priing rule motivates
households to loate inside the ring so they do not pay the toll. Competition
16
Monetary values of pollution are reviewed in Zaouali & de Palma (2007).
17
Without transport ongestion (externality) the unregulated equilibrium is optimal.
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for land inside the ordon raises land rent near the CBD. The land rent
urve shifts upwards near the ordon loation (f. Figure 6). A similar jump
appears in the distribution of households as shown in Figure 7.
In quantitative terms, this poliy redues the radius of the ity and the
average length of a trip by 27% and 13%, respetively. The average area
oupied by a household slightly inreases by 1% beause the land alloated
to roads is smaller. Congestion dereases by 11.5%. The gain in surplus
results from the derease in the opportunity ost of land (CL) and transport
ost (CT ). The onsumption of the homogeneous good inreases, but overall
the surplus inreases by 181e per household per year.
Notie that the housing area inreases slightly under CT, despite the
important derease in the radius of the ity. Indeed, the derease in the radius
of the ity indues a relatively smaller derease in the available land: from
(18) and (19), the available land for housing and transportation is relatively
small when r is large. The derease in the radius of the ity therefore does
not have a large impat (in relative terms) on the total amount of land
available for housing and transportation. At the same time, the amount
of land alloated to roads dereases at all distanes from the ity enter.
Overall, the resulting variation in the housing area remains almost the same.
The (optimal) linear toll
The linear toll requires that eah household pay 210e per kilometer (of daily
trips) per year. We obtain a partiularly small ity with a radius redued by
40% in omparison with the no toll situation. The trip-distane dereases by
17% whih may be seen as a derease in CO2 emissions. The orresponding
ity is haraterized by a redution in transport ost and opportunity ost
of land as well as an inrease in the onsumption of the omposite good.
The main weakness of the linear toll is that it signiantly redues the area
oupied by households signiantly: the average housing area dereases by
4.4% whih is relatively higher than the variation under ordon and rst-best
tolls.
The linear toll reahes a good eieny level in omparison with the
optimal toll. In our simulations, however, we found that it is equivalent to
a large inrease in the gasoline prie (about 12e/liter). Hene, the poliy is
likely to fae strong opposition from road users.
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First-best toll
The optimal toll leads, as expeted, to a ompat and dense ity. The radius
of the ity and trip-distane derease by 34% and 15%, respetively. The
onsumption of the homogeneous good inreases, but the opportunity ost
of land and transport osts are redued. Travel time dereases by 13%. The
derease in the radius and trip-distane remain, however, slightly lower than
under the linear toll. Poliy FB is partiularly eetive in onentrating
households around the CBD (f. Figure 7).
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Optimal ongestion priing inreases the welfare by 286e per household
per year. Cordon and linear tolls get 62% and 93% of this gain, respetively.
The amount of the toll olleted is relatively higher in omparison with all
the other priing shemes. With the optimal toll, the government budget is
balaned (f. ondition (23)) in the sense that total taxes are equal to the
ost of land used for transportation. Sine the other priing shemes provide
lower revenues, the government must nd alternative funding shemes.
4.2 Higher ongestion
When k in the ongestion funtion (16) inreases (Senario 1 in Table 5),
ongestion osts inrease, and an eient urban form orresponds to a fur-
ther onentration around the CBD. The radius of the ity inreases under
NT and dereases under FB. CT and LT indue a small inrease. The higher
ongestion is followed by an inrease in the land rent around the ity enter,
motivating households to loate further away from the CBD. This inentive is
higher than the opposing one indued by the (private) travel ost. Appropri-
ate tolling makes the seond inentive higher. There is more land alloated
to roads.
The transport ost and expenses on the homogeneous good inrease under
the four regimes, while the land ost dereases only under FB. It is lear that
an inrease in ongestion has a negative impat on welfare. The intuition for
this result is straightforward (notie the derease in housing area given by s).
CO2 emissions and other pollutants related to fuel onsumption vary in the
same diretion as VK: a higher ongestion is followed by a higher pollution
under all regimes exept FB.
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A set of simulations we do not report here onrms this fat under a larger set of
parameter values.
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4.3 Alternative preferenes
As the preferene for housing inreases (Senario 2 in Table 5), the ity radius
rf inreases under the four regimes. The variations with respet to the base-
ase are 25%, 28%, 15% and 13%, respetively for NT, CT, LT, and FB. At
the same time, the inrease in the average housing area is relatively small
for NT in omparison to LT and FB. This situation is brought about when
ongestion is unpried and too muh land is devoted to roads, leaving smaller
areas for housing.
From the output in Table 5 we an see that the larger ity leads to higher
travel time, higher onsumption of the homogeneous good and higher CO2
emissions. This result requires a higher ompensation for the households and
yields a lower level of surplus.
Under NT the inrease in s is relatively small in omparison with the
inrease in rf . Indeed, with unpried ongestion the expansion of the ity
leads to an over-investment in roads. CT and FB yield a higher area per
household beause a smaller area is devoted to roads.
5 Conlusion
This paper examined the impats of ongestion priing on the urban form.
Our analysis reveals the importane of tolling on household deisions and
onsequently on the urban struture of the ity. As a solution of the opti-
mality onditions we derive, among other variables, the households distribu-
tion and the amount of land alloated to transportation over the ity. Our
analysis onludes that onvenient ongestion priing leads to more eient
urban forms. The inrease in welfare results from the redued travel ost and
the better alloation of land between housing and roads. In monetary terms,
rst-best toll yields a welfare inrease estimated at 606 Me,19 Aounting for
environmental impat, the welfare gain of ongestion priing will be greater.
Using an alternative empirial approah, Daniel & Bekka (2000) estimate
that ongestion priing leads to a 10% redution of emissions. We found
that vehile-kilometer (and so the related emissions) an be redued by 16%.
The dierene is due to the fat that we integrate the long-term impats on
housing. De Palma & Lindsey (2006) obtain higher but omparable results.
19
From the base ase in Table 5, we have 286e as impat on the surplus. Aggregating
over the total population yields the value of 606Me.
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They take into aount a more general set of trips (not only home-to-work)
and other soures of externalities (noise, aidents, et.).
The linear toll reahes a good eieny level in omparison to the rst-
best sheme, but its implementation is equivalent to an important inrease
in the vehile operating ost. In pratie, the ordon toll represents a poten-
tial alternative. Indeed, it indues a satisfatory inrease in the housholds'
surplus and enounters lower opposition from road users, as revelaed by true
experiene in reent years.
The model we have onsidered does not intend to perfetly reprodue
housing and transportation in IDF. The monoentri model has well known
limitations and there is a number of issues relevant to the region IDF that
we have not disussed. In partiular, there are multiple (smaller) business
enters outside the CBD, and many working trips do not onern the CBD.
We have assumed that all households have the same revenue, the same pref-
erenes and make only a daily home-to-work trip.
20
One further limitation
in this model is that the attrativeness of the CBD is limited to savings in
transport osts. This assumption, whih is aeptable in simplied ontexts,
is not reasonable for agglomerations suh as Paris where other fats suh as
the riher soial life play an important role.
It is not easy to deal with all these fats at the same time, but the
theory of the polyentri ity is not yet suiently oherent and omplete to
represent a better alternative. Indeed, polyentri models do not refer to a
preise model, but rather to a lass of models. It would be useful to develop
an analysis based on polyentri models that overomes the weaknesses of
the monoentri model. Still, this approah would require an identiation
of the limitations, both theoretial and empirial, of the monoentri model.
Some of these limitations are diret extensions of the monoentri ity model,
and we plan to address these issues in future researh in whih we also plan
to add the multi-ordon toll sheme. Indeed, the solution approah adopted
here an be adapted to ordon priing. At the same time, our onlusions
about the impat of ongestion priing on the urban form and the levels of
emissions should extend to more ompliated frameworks.
20
Bruekner & Selod (2006) disusses the optimal hoie of transport systems.
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A Interpretation of the HST model
The neessary and suient onditions for a solution to the HST model,
formulated in Setion 2 above, are (7)-(9) and the following (22a)-(22f):
21
R(r) =
{
max(ψ(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u), ψT (
N(r)
LT (r)
)) rc ≤ r ≤ rf
RA r ≥ rf ,
(22a)
R(r) = ψ(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u) if n(r) > 0, (22b)
R(r) = ψT
(
N(r)
LT (r)
)
if LT (r) > 0, (22)
s(r) = S(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u), rc ≤ r ≤ rf , (22d)
n(r) =
L(r)− LT (r)
S(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u)
, rc ≤ r ≤ rf , (22e)
l(r) =
∫ r
rc
c′
(
N(x)
LT (x)
)
N(x)
LT (x)
dx, rc ≤ r ≤ rf . (22f)
Equations (22a), (22b) and (22) state that eah piee of land should be
alloated to the highest bidder. It follows that if both n(r) and LT (r) are
(stritly) positive, then the households' bid rent is equal to the bid rent of the
transport setor. Furthermore, at the outside boundary of the ity (at rf )
the bid rent funtion is equal to the agriultural rent RA. Condition (22d)
ensures that eah household is hoosing its bid-max lot size to maximize
its utility (from (1) and (2)). Equation (22e) implies that onstraint (7)
is binding at the optimum, i.e. all the available land within the ity is
used either for housing or transportation. The loation tax in (22f) reets
external osts indued by eah household. It an be shown that under this
ongestion priing the optimal solution yields∫ rf
rc
R(r)LT (r)dr =
∫ rf
rc
l(r)n(r)dr. (23)
meaning that the ost of transforming (agriultural) land to roads is just
equal to the total amount of ongestion tolls olleted. The government
budget is balaned in this sense.
21
See Fujita (1989).
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Transportation introdues externalities in the monoentri model and ef-
ient solutions an no longer be obtained without publi intervention.
22
In partiular, the loation tax given in (22f) is devised so that households
internalize the external osts they impose on other road users.
23
The e-
ient alloation an then be deentralized through a ompensated equilib-
rium (given by (22)), where the government hooses g, l(r) and LT (r). The
deentralization is a onsequene of the fat that the solution to any om-
pensated equilibrium an be obtained as a solution to the HST model and
vie versa. The government an reah any target utility level by imposing
adequate population taxes. The government deides on the taxes to ollet
and the amount of land to alloate to roads at eah distane. Let HST (u)
refer to the Herbert-Stevens model with tra ongestion when the target
utility is equal to u.24 The following result (adapted from Fujita (1989))
states the relation between the HST model and ompetitive equilibria.
Proposition 2. (R(r), n(r), s(r), LT (r), rf , g
∗, l(r)) is a solution to the HST (u)
if and only if it is a ompensated equilibrium under target utility u.
The total surplus in (6) may be written as
S =
∫ rf
rc
{
(
Y − g − l(r)− Z(s(r), u)
s(r)
− RA
)
s(r)n(r)
− LT (r)RA + gn(r) + l(r)n(r)} dr. (24)
Using (5), (22b) and (23), it beomes
S =
∫ rf
rc
(R(r)− RA)L(r)dr︸ ︷︷ ︸
TDR
+ g N, (25)
where TDR stands for total dierential rent. To illustrate the solution for
varying utility levels, let us write S , TDR and g as a funtion of u. We
have from (24) and (25):
S (u) = TDR(u) +N g(u). (26)
22
In the absene of transportation externalities the ompetitive solution without gov-
ernment intervention is eient.
23
The impat of unpried ongestion is disussed in Arnott (1979) and Arnott & MaK-
innon (1978).
24
We disuss how the values of u (and/or g) are hosen (and what it reets).
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Figure 4: HST model and ompensated equilibria.
The funtion S has the following properties:25 S (u) is ontinuously in-
reasing in u, and limu→−∞ S (u) = N (Y −τ(rc)) and limu→+∞S (u) = −∞.
The funtion g has the following properties: g(u) is ontinuously dereasing
in u, limu→−∞ g(u) = Y − τ(rc) and limu→+∞ g(u) = −∞.
Figure 4, whih is adapted from Fujita (1989), is useful for understanding
the relationship between the solution to the HST and ompensated equilibria.
The surplus related to the rst-best optimum is given by urve S (u). When
the tolling sheme is not optimal, we neessarily obtain a lower level of surplus
for any utility level. Under a non-optimal ongestion priing, urve S (u)
therefore moves downwards as the dashed urve. The total dierential rent
an either be redistributed to the households or to an absentee land owner.
In the latter ase, the households revenue is just Y . From Proposition 2 it is
lear that point A orresponds to the solution of the ompetitive equilibrium
or to the ompensated equilibrium with target utility u∗. This solution is
25
These properties are obtained as an extension to the model without transportation
externalities (see Fujita 1989, page 74).
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obtained under optimal ongestion priing, so if we set l(r) to a dierent
level we obtain a lower level of surplus. To reah the utility level at point B
the households must reeive a total subsidy equal to TDR(u)/N . Suh is
the situation where the total dierential rent is redistributed to ity itizens.
The same is the solution to a ompetitive equilibrium with an absentee land
owner but where the revenue Y is replaed by Y + TDR(u)/N . The ase
where only part of the rent is redistributed is an intermediate ase between
the two extremes.
In this sense, g may be interpreted as a ontrol variable that indiates
how muh of the total dierential rate is redistributed to ity residents. The
HST model an be seen from another perspetive. If the utility level is given,
the population tax should be designed so that ondition (9) is met. That
is, the population in the ity remains equal to N . Indeed, g appears in the
solution as a multiplier for this ondition (See Fujita 1989, page68).
In many papers, (Kanemoto 1977, Robson 1976, Pines & Sadka 1985,
inter alios) the problem has been formulated as utility maximization under
the revenue onstraint. This result may be obtained from the HST model by
nding the highest level of utility given the budget onstraint
N Y ≥
∫ rf
rc
{[τ(r) + Z(s(r), u) +RAs(r)]n(r) +RALT (r)}dr
is satised, i.e. total revenue is higher than total osts. However, notie that
this onstraint is just S (u) ≥ 0 whih in Figure 4 oinides with point B.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let us denote the road oupany at r by Γ(r), i.e.
Γ(r) :=
N(r)
LT (r)
(27)
Replaing (8) and (27) by an equality between dierentials with appro-
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priate boundary onditions, we may easily write all equations (7)-(9) as

N ′(r) = −n(r)
LT (r) = N
′(r)s(r) + L(r)
Γ(r) =
N(r)
LT (r)
T ′(r) = c(Γ(r))
s(r) = S(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u)
for rc ≤ r ≤ rf , (28)
with boundary onditions 

τ(rc) = 0
l(rc) = 0
N(rc) = N
N(rf ) = 0 .
(29)
Now, let us examine equations (22a)- (22) involving R(r). Reall that
we have assumed n(r) > 0 and LT (r) > 0 for rc ≤ r < rf . Thus, the three
equations (22a)- (22) are equivalent to

R(r) = RA for r ≥ rf
R(r) = ψT (Γ(r)) for rc ≤ r < rf
ψT (Γ(r)) = ψ(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u) for rc ≤ r < rf .
(30)
Notie that by ontinuity at rf the rst two equations imply that
ψT (Γ(rf)) = RA .
Now, let us onsider the third equation. Notie that
ψ(Y − g − l(r)− τ(r), u) = R(r)
⇔ Y − g − l(r)− τ(r) = φ(R(r), u) by (10)
⇔ l(r) + τ(r) = Y − g − φ(R(r), u)
⇔


l′(r) + τ ′(r) = −
∂φ
∂R
(R(r), u))R′(r)
ψ(Y − g, u) = R(rc) by (29)
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Reolleting all the results above gives the following equivalent formulation
of onditions (22a)-(22e):

R′(r) = −
l′(r) + c(Γ(r))
∂φ
∂R
(R(r), u)
for rc ≤ r < rf
R(rf) = RA
N ′(r) =
N(r)
Γ(r)
− L(r)
S(φ(R(r), u), u)
N(rc) = N
N(rf ) = 0
LT (r) =
N(r)
Γ(r)
g = Y − φ(ψT (Γ(rc)), u)
s(r) = S(φ(R(r), u), u)
R(r) =
{
ψT (Γ(r)) for rc ≤ r ≤ rf
RA for r ≥ rf
(31)
We end up by replaing Γ(r) by ψ−1T (R(r)) in the two dierential equations.
C Numerial implementation
An NSP software was developed to solve (11).
 a rst funtion omputes an approximate solution Rrf (r) and Nrf (r) of
the double bakward dierential equation (11) over the interval [rc; rf ],
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rewritten here:

R′(r) = −
H(ψ−1T (R(r))) + c(ψ
−1
T (R(r)))
∂Rφ(R(r), u)
N ′(r) =
N(r)/ψ−1T (R(r))− L(r)
S(φ(R(r), u), u)
with nal onditions R(rf ) = RA, N(rf ) = 0
In order to autiously solve the equations above, the following numer-
ial proedure was used:
1. Initialization. Set n = 0, r0 = rf , R
0 = RA, N
0 = 0
2. while rn > rc do
(a) ompute R′(rn) and N ′(rn)
(b) ompute δrn = min
[
rn − rc,max
(
δrmin,min(δrmax,
εRA
|R′(rn)|
, εN
|N ′(rn)|
)
)]
;
note that three parameters are used: the maximum and mini-
mum admissible values for δrn, δrmin and δrmax, and a fration
ε limiting the progress of the numerial integration.
() n→ n+ 1
(d) rn+1 := rn − δrn, Rn+1 = Rn − δrnR′(rn), Nn+1 = Nn −
δrnN ′(rn)
3. Conlusion. Sine rn = rc, set Rrf (rc) = R
n
and Nrf (rc) = N
n
 a seond funtion searhes and nds rf (using dihotomy) suh that
Nrf (rc) = N . The algorithm is the following:
1. Initialization. Set r1 = rc, r2 = 2rc, r3 = 3rc; ompute Nj =
Nrj (rc)−N , for j ∈ 1, 2, 3.
2. while
|N1|
N
> 10−6 and |r3−r1|
rr2
> 10−5, do
(a) if N1N2 < 0 (the solution lies in [r1; r2]) then
i. set r3 = r2, N3 = N2, r2 = (r1 + r2)/2
ii. ompute N2 = Nr2(rc)−N
(b) else if N2N3 < 0 (the solution lies in [r2; r3]) then
i. set r1 = r2, N1 = N2, r2 = (r2 + r3)/2
ii. ompute N2 = Nr2(rc)−N
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() else the solution does not lie in [r1; r3]) then
i. set r1 = r2, N1 = N2, r2 = r3, N2 = N3, r3 = 1.1 r3
ii. ompute N3 = Nr3(rc)−N
There is a further detail that should be taken into aount in the iterations.
Sine N ′(r) is always negative, from the seond line in (11) we have:
ψ−1T (R(r)) ≥
N(r)
L(r)
.
Hene, ψ−1T (R) in (15) is replaed by
ψ−1T (R(r)) = max
{
N(r)
L(r)
, (
R(r)
kλ
)
1
1+λ
}
.
This hange is important when the area just next to the CBD border is
exlusively alloated for transportation.
D Notation
Variable desription
r distane to the ity enter [L℄
rc radius of the distrit enter [L℄
rf radius of the urban fringe [L℄
c(γ) marginal transport ost [eL−1℄ as funtion of road oupany
g population tax per household [e℄
l(r) loation tax per household at r [e℄
N(r) number of households loated further away than r from the ity enter
N total households in the ity
Y annual inome [e℄
n(r) linei density of households at r [L−1℄
R(r) rent at r per unit of area [eL−2℄
RA opportunity ost of land [eL
−2
℄
s(r) housing area per agent at r [L2℄
L(r) total amount of land available at r [L1℄
LT (r) amount of land devoted to transport use at r [L
1
℄
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Ring (km) Households Veh. used for home-to-work trips travel time (hours) Land rent (e/m*m/year)
3.5-7 674 832 140 956 102.39
7-14 1 260 076 580 538 0.37 82.03
14-21 771 020 491 077 0.50 74.07
21-28 438 363 336 195 0.63 70.22
28-35 252 913 225 534 0.74 69.41
35-42 130 083 115 719 0.87 68.64
42-49 109 050 96 744 0.97 71.14
49-56 72 312 59 604 1.10 68.83
56-63 54 568 47 144 1.23 72.31
63-70 32 559 26 983 1.33 69.34
total 2 120 493
Table 4: Data on IDF for ten rings.
tx rf s V K RD TT TT0 CL CT CZ ∆S
Total City Housing Trip Roads' Travel Free-ow Land Transp. Composite ∆surp
tax radius area length area time TT ost ost good ost
e/y km m2 km 104 m2 mins mins e/y e/y e/y e/y
Base-ase. Cordon toll: loated at 21.998km, value 22.457e/day; Linear: κ = 0.21/m/year
No toll 769 73.423 84.236 22.075 7 539 37.68 21.00 5 750 3 469 41 671 0
Cordon toll 2 410 55.633 84.889 19.633 6 482 33.90 18.24 5 499 3 081 42 147 181
Linear toll 3 541 46.246 81.385 18.727 6 042 32.70 17.22 5 185 2 960 42 479 271
First-best 7 172 48.650 83.129 18.711 6 049 33.70 17.22 5 360 3 021 42 222 286
Senario 1. k′ : 6.6 → 10.0 Cordon toll: loated at 21.496km, value 26.065e/day; Linear: κ = 0.24/m/year
No toll 778 75.241 81.339 22.280 8 196 40 21 5 760 3 673 42 057 0
Cordon toll 2 534 55.493 82.629 19.579 6 949 36 18 5 539 3 285 42 445 236
Linear toll 3 605 44.935 78.635 18.521 6 394 35 17 5 222 3 157 42 765 347
First-best 8 141 47.788 80.726 18.556 6 430 35 17 5 331 3 163 42 629 368
Senario 2. α + β = 1 and β : 0.20 → 0.21 Cordon toll: loated at 22.200km, value 24.783e/day; Linear: κ = 0.22/m/year
No toll 790 89.677 85.224 22.583 7 571 40 22 5 805 3 667 44 907 0
Cordon toll 2 625 68.474 87.307 20.522 6 722 37 19 5 716 3 369 45 135 173
Linear toll 3 530 52.415 84.401 19.545 6 261 36 18 5 469 3 253 45 385 273
First-best 8 037 55.953 86.104 19.494 6 253 35 18 5 549 3 246 45 293 292
Table 5: Summary statistis under dierent priing regimes and parameter
values.
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Figure 5: The fration of land available for transportation and housing.
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